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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 20050672-CA

VAL DEAN GIBSON,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a criminal restitution order imposed in a non-first
degree felony criminal case in the Third District Court of Utah, Salt Lake County,
the Honorable William W. Barrett presiding. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did defendant waive his res judicata defense to restitution by agreeing to
pay restitution in his plea agreement?
Standard of Review. This issue is raised by the appellee for the first time on
appeal as an alternative ground to affirm the trial court. See State v. Hechtle, 2004 UT
App 96, \ 17 n.4,89 P.3d 185. Thus, no standard of review applies.

2. Does res judicata limit restitution in a criminal case to the amount obtained
by the victim in a prior civil judgment?
Standard of Review. This issue requires interpretation of a judicial doctrine—
res judicata—and the interpretation a statute—the Crime Victims Restitution Act.
Both are question of law reviewed by this Court for correctness. See State v. Garcia,
866 P.2d 5,6 (Utah App. 1993) (interpreting restitution statute); Macris & Assoc, Inc.
v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, % 17,16 P.3d 1214 (reviewing lower court's application
of res judicata).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
This appeal concerns the Crime Victims Restitution Act, found in Utah Code
Ann. § 77-38a-101 through Utah Code Ann. 77-38a-601 (West Supp. 2005), attached
as Addendum D.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS1
Defendant

has never

denied

embezzling $144,702.45 from

Gomez

Landscaping (R. 161-62; 430:12). He claimed only that the trial court could not
order criminal restitution in that amount because the victim had already obtained a
civil judgment against him for $59,000. Aplt. Br. at 4.

1

Defendant pled guilty, so the facts are taken from the pleadings and the
preliminary hearing and restitution hearing transcripts.
2

The crime. Gomez contracted with defendant to do accounting for his
landscaping business in 1999 (R. 429:131-32). Defendant agreed to provide payroll
services, including cutting payroll checks and paying payroll taxes (R. 429:131-32).
Each pay period, Gomez would write one check to defendant for payroll and taxes
(R. 429:132). Defendant would then cut individual checks to each employee and
send checks to the state and federal tax authorities (R. 429:132).
Defendant performed these services as agreed in 1999 (R. 429:131-33). But in
2000, defendant stopped making deposits with the federal and state tax authorities
(R. 429:133). He continued to accept money from Gomez, but did not forward the
tax payments (R. 429:133-34). Gomez did not discover defendant's embezzlement
until 2001, when the tax authorities notified him of his failure to file (R. 429:133-34).
The civil suit. On June 7, 2002, Gomez filed a civil complaint against
defendant in the Utah Third District Court (R. 317-21, 361-65). Gomez alleged
conversion and fraudulent conversion for embezzling his payroll taxes during the
third and fourth quarters of 2001 (R. 318-19). He also claimed that defendant
refused to turn over Gomez's tax records and refused to return the embezzled
funds. Gomez asked for $59,000 in damages plus attorneys fees and punitive
damages (R. 321).
Forty-nine days later, on July 25,2002, Gomez moved for a default judgment
against defendant (R. 322-26). The district court held a hearing on the motion, but
3

defendant failed to appear (R. 312). So the court entered a default judgment against
him for $59,880.29, "plus all interest and additional penalties imposed by the IRS or
the Utah Tax Commission/7 and punitive damages of $60,000 (R. 312-13).
The criminal charges. Three months later, on November 15,2002, the State
filed a criminal information against defendant (R. 1-6). The information alleged
three counts of income tax evasion, one count of filing a false return, two counts of
unlawful dealing by a fiduciary, two counts of communications fraud, and two
counts of unlawful and unprofessional conduct (R. 1-4). The State later amended
the information to include a racketeering charge (R. 148-54). The unlawful dealing
charges alleged that defendant embezzled money from Gomez Landscaping in 2000
and 2001 (R. 2-4,148-54).
In July of 2004, the State and defendant reached a plea agreement. Defendant
pled guilty to one count of tax evasion, one count of filing a false return, one count
of unlawful dealing, one count of communications fraud, and one count of
unprofessional conduct (R. 159-72). He also agreed "that criminal restitution for
unpaid state taxes and for losses to private victims will be requested by the State
and my be entered in this case for all years, not just the years on [sic] tax year(s) for
which I am pleading" (R. 165). Defendant further agreed "that the State is seeking
and/or may seek as criminal restitution, amounts not only for the counts for which I
am entering pleas, but also for those counts which, in accordance with the
4

agreement are being dismissed, including restitution to all private individuals)' 7 (R.
165). He also acknowledged that "the State firmly believes as of the time of the
entering of this Statement that restitution to private victim Gomez will be at or
above $148,955" (R. 165).
In exchange for his plea, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts (R.
165). It also agreed to recommend probation and "a fine in the low range of that
applicable by law" (R. 166).
After his plea, defendant retained new counsel and moved unsuccessfully to
withdraw his plea (R. 194-95,204-11,266-67). On December 13,2004, the trial court
sentenced defendant to suspended prison terms and three years probation,
including sixty days in jail (R. 279-83). Defendant did not appeal his conviction. A
month later, the State filed a Notice of Restitution Amounts that requested
$148,955.63 restitution for Clark Gomez (R. 300). Defendant requested a restitution
hearing (R. 305).
At the restitution hearing, defendant did not dispute the restitution amount;
rather, he claimed res judicata (R. 430:10-11). Specifically, he asserted that the
restitution statute defined "pecuniary damages" as those damages that the
defendant could recover in a civil suit against the defendant (R. 430:11). Since
Gomez had already obtained a civil judgment against him for conversion, defendant

5

claimed that res judicata precluded the State from relitigating the issue of damages
(R. 430:12).
The State responded that Gomez's civil complaint and judgment was limited
to the third and fourth quarter of 2001 and that Gomez had since discovered
additional losses (R. 430:15-16). The court agreed with the State and entered a
restitution order for $144,702.45 (R. 430:20-21). It required, however, that payments
made on Gomez's civil judgment be credited against the restitution judgment (R.
430:21-22). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court from that order
(R. 419).2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that the doctrine of res judicata precludes a trial court from
ordering restitution in an amount greater than a victim's prior civil judgment
against the defendant. Res judicata is an affirmative defense, however, that may be
waived. In this case, defendant waived res judicata by agreeing in his plea bargain
to pay restitution "for all years" and for all counts, including the dismissed counts.
Even if defendant had not waived a res judicata defense, his claim would fail
on its merits. Res judicata requires privity between the party to the first litigation

2

The district court's restitution order was erroneously omitted from the
record. The parties by stipulation supplemented the record with a signed copy of
the order. See Order of March 28, 2006, Case No. 20050672-CA, attached as
Addendum A.
6

and the party in the second litigation. But under the Crime Victim's Restitution Act,
the State and the victim are not in privity. The victim has an independent right to
sue the defendant for damages, regardless of the outcome of the criminal action.
Additionally, the State and the victim are not privies under traditional
principles of privity because the State is not asserting the same legal right as the
victim. The States has a right to seek restitution for remedial and rehabilitative
purposes that is independent of the victim's right to sue the defendant civilly.
Furthermore, the issue decided by the civil litigation was not the same as the
issue in the criminal restitution. Clark Gomez brought a conversion claim for only
the third and fourth quarters of 2001. The State sought restitution for the entirety of
defendant's criminal conduct against Gomez for the years 2000 and 2001.

7

ARGUMENT
I. DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS RES JUDICATA DEFENSE IN HIS
PLEA BARGAIN
Defendant asserts that res judicata precludes the trial court from imposing
restitution in an amount greater than the civil judgment Gomez obtained. But
defendant affirmatively waived his res judicata defense in his plea bargain with the
State. 3
By pleading guilty, a defendant waives a host of claims, defenses, and rights.
See James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 570 (Utah App. 1998) (stating that
"nonjurisdictional issues may be waived by a guilty plea"). "The general rule
applicable in criminal proceedings, and the cases are legion, is that by pleading
guilty, the defendant is deemed to have admitted all of the essential elements of the
crime charged and thereby waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged
pre-plea constitutional violations/ 7 State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275,1278 (Utah 1989)
see also James, 965 P.2d at 572-73 (holding that guilty plea waived statute of
limitations defense).
Additionally, in a plea agreement, both the State and the defendant may
waive other rights and claims or assume additional obligations that are not

3

The State did not raise waiver at the restitution hearing. But this Court may
affirm the judgment below on any ground apparent in the record. See State v.
Hechtle, 2004 UT App 9 6 , 1 1 7 n.4, 89 P.3d 185.
8

necessarily waived or assumed by a guilty plea. For example, a defendant may
plead guilty to a crime for which he could not have been convicted to obtain a lesser
sentence. See Cook v. Hurst, 777 P.2d 1029,1038 (Utah 1989) (upholding guilty plea
for aggravated sexual abuse of a child when defendant did not occupy special
position of trust, an element of that offense). Or a defendant may agree to testify
against a co-defendant or cooperate in investigating other offenses. He may also
agree to pay restitution for conduct for which he was not criminally charged. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(a) (West 2004). The State, on the other hand, might
agree to drop certain charges, extend immunity for certain offenses or time periods,
or agree to make certain recommendations at sentencing.
In fact, a plea agreement is not unlike a civil settlement agreement.
Regardless of the evidence, the charges filed, or the defenses available, the State and
the defendant are free to fashion a settlement that expedites resolution of the
criminal charges without a trial. In fashioning such an agreement, the parties may
negotiate away claims and defenses that otherwise would have been available had
they proceeded to trial.
Like any other non-jurisdictional claim or defense, res judicata is waivable.
Under the rules of civil procedure, a res judicata claim is waived unless it is pleaded
in the defendant's answer. See Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c) (listing res judicata as an
affirmative defense); Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h) (stating that parties waive all defenses not
9

raised in answer). Additionally, the supreme court has stated that res judicata "is an
affirmative defense in both criminal and civil cases and therefore waivable." State v.
Perank, 858 P.2d 927,931 n.3 (Utah 1992).
In the instant case, the parties settled defendant's criminal charges through a
plea agreement. In that agreement, the State dismissed six of the eleven charges
pending against defendant, including five second degree felonies (R. 148-54,159-60,
165). It also agreed not file any additional criminal tax charges for crimes occurring
before the date of the plea (R. 165). The State further committed to recommend to
the sentencing court that defendant receive probation and a fine "in the low range of
that applicable by law" (R. 166).
In exchange for the State's concessions, defendant pled guilty to the
remaining five charges (R. 159-60). He also agreed that "criminal restitution for
unpaid state taxes and for losses to private victims will be requested by the State
and may be entered in this case for all years, not just the years on [sic] tax year(s) for
which [he] [was] pleading" (R. 165). He further agreed that the State "may seek as
criminal restitution amounts not only for the counts for which [he] [was] entering
pleas, but also for those counts which, in accordance with this agreement are being
dismissed, including restitution to all private individual(s)" (R. 165).

Lastly,

defendant understood that "the State firmly believes as of the time of the entering of
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this Statement that restitution to private victim Gomez will be at or above $148,955"
(R. 165).
Defendant now seeks to undo that agreement and assert a res judicata defense
to the State's restitution claim. But defendant waived that defense when he agreed
that the court could impose restitution for all years and all charges, including
dismissed charges (R. 165). Moreover, rescinding the agreement at this stage would
unfairly prejudice the State. The State agreed to drop more than half the charges
and to give defendant a favorable recommendation at sentencing in exchange for his
promise to fully recompense the victim of his criminal conduct. But the State can no
longer revoke its sentencing recommendation, nor can it reinstate the dismissed
charges. Allowing a res judicata defense would thus cost the State the benefit of its
bargain.
Accordingly, this Court should uphold the terms of the plea agreement, hold
that defendant waived his res judicata defense in his plea bargain, and affirm the
trial court's restitution order.
II. RES JUDICATA DOES NOT APPLY BETWEEN A CIVIL
JUDGMENT AND CRIMINAL RESTITUTION
Even if defendant had not waived his res judicata claim in the plea agreement,
his claim would still fail because res judicata does not apply to the government at a
criminal restitution hearing.

11

A. Res judicata has two branches—claim preclusion and issue
preclusion.
Res judicata is a general term that describes the preclusive effect a judgment
has on the parties. See Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremoco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19,
125,110 P.3d 678. Under res judicata, a final judgment prevents the parties or their
privies from relitigating the same claims or the same issues that were resolved by
that judgment. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13, f 33, 73 P.3d 325. Res
judicata thus has two branches: claim preclusion and issue preclusion. 4 Id.
"Generally, claim preclusion bars a party from prosecuting in a subsequent
action a claim that has been fully litigated previously." Id. at f 34 (citations and
quotations omitted). The party asserting claim preclusion as a defense must
establish three elements: (1) that both cases involve the same parties or their privies;
(2) that the allegedly barred claim was presented in the first case or could and
should have been presented in the first case; and (3) that the first case resulted in a
final judgment on the merits. Id.

4

Traditionally, res judicata referred only to claim preclusion, and issue
preclusion was known as collateral estoppel. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90,94
(1980) More commonly today, the term "res judicata" is used to generally describe
the preclusive effect a judgment has on the parties and includes both claim
preclusion and issue preclusion. See Tremoco, 2005 UT 19, ^ 25. This brief uses "res
judicata" in that sense.
12

Issue preclusion, on the other hand, may arise from a different cause of action
and bars only relitigation of a particular issue. Id. at % 35. The party asserting issue
preclusion as a defense must establish four elements: (1) that both cases involve the
same parties or their privies; (2) that the issue decided in the first case is identical to
the issue in the second case; (3) that the issue in the first case was completely, fully,
and fairly litigated; and (4) that the first case resulted in a final judgment on the
merits. Id.
Defendant claims that both claim preclusion and issue preclusion apply to the
State's request for restitution. But as explained below, neither branch of res judicata
applies to the government in a restitution hearing.
B. Res judicata does not apply because the State is not a privy of
the victim.
Both branches of res judicata require that the prior and subsequent cases
involve the same parties or their privies. The State was not a party to Gomez's civil
lawsuit against defendant, nor is Gomez a party to the criminal case against
defendant. Thus defendant can only assert res judicata if the State is in privity with
Gomez.
A party is in privity with another for purposes of res judicata when that party
is "so identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right."
Searle Bros. v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689,691 (Utah 1978). Traditionally, privity occurs in "a

13

mutual or successive relationship to rights in property/' id., or when a judgment is
obtained by one legally appointed to represent another, such as a guardian or
trustee, see Tremoco, 2005 UT 19, \ 29.
The State is not the privy of a crime victim for two reasons. First, under the
Crime Victims Restitution Act, there is no privity between the victim and State.
Second, when traditional principles of privity are applied, it is clear that the victim
and the State each have their own legal right to require the defendant to pay
restitution. Thus they enjoy no privity.
1. Under the Crime Victims Restitution Act, there is no privity
between the State and the victim.
The Crime Victims Restitution Act makes clear that the legislature did not
intend for there to be privity between the State and the victim. Section 403(1) of the
Act describes the victim's right to seek a separate civil judgment against the
defendant and the relationship between that civil judgment and the restitution
order. It is, essentially, the "res judicata" section of the Act:
(1) Provisions in this part concerning restitution do not limit or impair
the right of a person injured by a defendant's criminal activities to sue
and recover damages from the defendant in a civil action. Evidence
that the defendant has paid or been ordered to pay restitution under
this part may not be introduced in any civil action arising out of the
facts or events which were the basis for the restitution. However, the
court shall credit any restitution paid by the defendant to a victim
against any judgment in favor of the victim in the civil action.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-403(l) (West 2004).
14

Section 403(1) establishes three principles: (1) criminal restitution proceedings
do not limit the victim's right to recover civilly; (2) the criminal restitution order
may not be entered as evidence in the victim's civil action; and (3) any restitution
paid must be credited against the victim's civil judgment. Thus, under section
403(1), a crime victim's damages may be litigated twice. Moreover, the victim is not
bound in any way by the criminal restitution proceedings.
If the victim can litigate his damages independently from the criminal
restitution proceedings, the victim cannot be a privy of the State. Conversely, the
State must not be a privy of the victim. Res judicata does not therefore apply.
Defendant nevertheless argues that the Crime Victim's Restitution Act ("the
Act") should not be used to give a crime victim another opportunity litigate the
question of damages. Aplt. Br. at 8-9. He claims under section 403(2) of the Act that
a restitution order is "res judicata in any subsequent civil action" and that the
"converse must also be true." Aplt. Br. at 9. Defendant misinterprets that section.
Section 403(2) concerns the preclusive effect of a criminal conviction, not
restitution. It states, "If conviction in a criminal trial necessarily decides the issue of
a defendant's liability for pecuniary damages of a victim, that issue is conclusively
determined as to the defendant if it is involved in a subsequent civil action." Utah
Code Ann. § 77-38a-403(2). By the plain language of section 403(2), defendant's
conviction is res judicata as to the question of liability, not damages. That is, section
15

403(2) estops a defendant from relitigating the question of liability when that
question is "conclusively determined" by the criminal trial. Id.
As explained above, section 403(1), not 403(2), governs the relationship
between criminal restitution and the victim's civil lawsuit. According to that
section, the Act does not "limit or impair the right of a person injured by a
defendant's criminal activities to sue and recover damages from the defendant in a
civil action." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-403(l) (West 2004). Barring further recovery
in a civil action on res judicata grounds would "limit or impair" the victim's right to
recover damages from the defendant. Thus the victim is not the State's privy, and,
as defendant argues under his misconstruction of section 403, "The converse must
also be true." Aplt. Br. at 9. The State is not the victim's privy. Res judicata does
not, therefore, apply between criminal restitution proceedings and a victim's civil
action for damages.
2. Under traditional privity tests, the State is not the victim's
privy because it has its own legal right to require the
defendant to pay restitution.
Even if the Crime Victims Restitution Act did not speak to the issue of privity,
defendant's claim would still fail, because the State and the victim are not privies
under traditional principles of privity.
As explained above, a party is in privity with another for purposes of res
judicata when that party is "so identified in interest with another that he represents
16

the same legal right." Searle Bros., 588 P.2d 691. Traditionally, privity occurs in "a
mutual or successive relationship to rights in property," id., or when a judgment is
obtained by one legally appointed to represent another, such as a guardian or
trustee, see Tremoco, 2005 UT 19,129.
Defendant claims that the State is Gomez's privy because, "the state can only
prove damages by standing in for the victim." Aplt. Br. at 7. But the fact that
restitution is measured by what the victim could recover in a civil lawsuit does not
make the State the victim's privy. The State is not asserting the "same legal right" as
the victim in a civil action. Tremoco, 2005 UT 19, % 29. Rather, the State is asserting a
right independent of the victim's civil remedy: the right to prosecute, punish, and
rehabilitate criminals.
While criminal restitution is a civil penalty that facilitates recovery by the
victim, it is also a remedial and rehabilitative measure that is part of the criminal
sentence. "When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall
order that the defendant make restitution to the victims

" Utah Code Ann. § 76-

3-201 (4)(a). In determining court ordered restitution, the court must consider,
among other things, "the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of
restitution and the method of payment." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5)(c)(iii)
(West 2004).
17

Oregon, on whose restitution statute Utah's is based, see State v. Twitchell, 832
P.2d 866,869 (Utah App. 1992), has recognized the penal nature of restitution. "The
theory of restitution is penological: It is intended to serve rehabilitative and
deterrent purposes by causing a defendant to appreciate the relationship between
his criminal activity and the damage suffered by the victim." State v. Dillon, 637
P.2d 602,606 (Or. 1981). Thus, the State's right to seek criminal restitution derives
not just from the victim's right to compensation, but also from its own right to seek
a sentence that will rehabilitate the offender.
Measuring damages by the victim's civil recovery rights does not mean the
State stands in for the victim to recover his damages. Rather, civil damages are used
to help the defendant "appreciate the relationship between his criminal activity and
the damage suffered by the victim." Id. If a prior civil judgment is res judicata to
criminal restitution, then a victim's faulty or incomplete litigation of his damages
will infringe on the State's right to use restitution to rehabilitate an offender. To
fully serve the rehabilitative purposes of restitution, the State must have an
independent right to require an offender to pay restitution. It thus is not the
victim's privy, and res judicata does not apply.
Defendant also claims that privity exists under another theory: litigation
control. Aplt. Br. at 7. A person "'who is not a party to an action but who controls
or substantially participates in the control of the presentation on behalf of a party is
18

bound by the determination of issues decided as though he were a party/" Tremoco,
2005 UT 19, \ 30 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 39).5 He claims that
the State and Gomez are in privity because "the State has control over the claim for
economic damages/ 7 Aplt. Br. at 7. But defendant misconstrues this type of privity.
Privity by control of the litigation arises when a non-party to a lawsuit directs
and controls the lawsuit on behalf of another in order to protect its own interest.
Tremoco, 2005 UT 19, \ 30. The judgment of that lawsuit becomes res judicata to the
non-party.

For example, in United States v. Montana, the federal government

directed and financed a lawsuit by a construction company against the state of
Montana challenging a Montana public construction tax. United States v. Montana,
440 U.S. 147, 151 (1979). The United States also filed its own lawsuit against
Montana challenging the tax. Id. The private suit concluded first and resulted in a
judgment upholding the tax. Id. Montana then claimed res judicata in the suit by
the United States. Id at 151-52.

5

The supreme court has recognized that this type of privity—litigation
control—may not be used to establish claim preclusion. This is because '"the cause
of action which a nonparty has vicariously asserted differs by definition from that
which he subsequently seeks to litigate in his own right." 7 Tremoco, 2005 UT 19 \ 32
(quoting United States v. Montana, 440 U.S. 147,154 (1979)). Thus, defendant may
only use this type of privity to establish issue preclusion.
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The Supreme Court held that the United States was bound by the judgment in
the prior case because it had controlled and financed the litigation. Id. at 154-55.
The court noted, "[Although not a party, the United States plainly had a sufficient
laboring oar in the conduct of the state-court litigation to actuate principles of
etsoppel." Id. at 155 (quotations omitted).
Unlike the United States in Montana, the State did not control the litigation in
Gomez's civil suit against defendant. In fact, there is no evidence that the State was
even aware of the civil suit at the time it happened. The State cannot, therefore, be
said to have had its day in court with respect to defendant's restitution obligation.
C Res judicata does not apply in the instant case because the
restitution order was based, in part, on criminal conduct not at
issue in the prior civil suit
Even if there were privity between the State and the victim, res judicata
would not apply in this case. For res judicata to apply, the claims and issues in the
first case must be identical to the claims and issues in the instant case, or the claims
in the instant case must have been claims that could and should have been brought
in the first case. See Tremoco, 2005 UT 19, \ \ 26-27. Where the claims or issues in
the instant case are not identical to those in the first case and are not claims that
could and should and should have been raised in the first case, res judicata does not
bar litigation of those claims or issues. Id.
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Here, the issues and claims decided in the restitution proceeding were not
identical to the issues and claims decided by the civil action. Defendant's civil
complaint alleged that defendant had fraudulently converted funds during the third
and fourth quarters of 2001 (R. 318-19, 362-63). The complaint did not allege any
injurious conduct or damages during any other time period, and the default
judgment did not purport to resolve claims or issues as to any other time period.
The criminal charges, on the other hand, covered all of 2000 and all of 2001 (R. 8-9).
At the restitution hearing, the prosecutor explained that the larger restitution
amount was a result of the greater time period covered by the criminal charges (R.
430:16). The court agreed and imposed the greater restitution amount (R. 430:1821).
Because Gomez's civil action never litigated the issue of damages for
defendant's criminal conduct during 2000 and 2001, there is no identity of issues
between the civil judgment and the criminal restitution order. So issue prelusion
does not bar restitution greater than $59,000.
Nor does claim preclusion bar the larger amount. Gomez never brought a
civil claim against defendant for his conduct during 2000 and the first half of 2001.
Nor could he have, because he was unaware of defendant's injurious conduct.
Claim preclusion bars only claims that were brought in the first action or claims that
could and should have been brought in the first action. See Maoris & Assoc, v.
21

Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, \ 20,16 P.3d 1214. For claim preclusion purposes, a claim
could and should have been brought only if the "plaintiff was aware of the facts
upon which the later claims were based at the time the first suit was filed/' Id. at \
24.
Defendant did not show at the restitution hearing that Gomez could and
should have filed claims for 2000 and the first half of 2001. See Busch v. Busch, 2003
UT App 131,1 6, 71 P.3d 177 ("The party asserting res judicata has the burden to
prove its elements"). In fact, the record suggests that when Gomez filed his civil
complaint, he was not even aware of defendant's criminal actions during 2000 and
the first half of 2001. His complaint alleged that defendant had refused to turn over
the tax returns he had filed for Gomez Landscaping (R. 319, 363). Later, at the
preliminary hearing in the criminal case, Gomez testified that defendant had
refused to assist him in determining the extent of his embezzlement and Gomez
Landscaping's resultant tax liability (R. 429:133-34). He explained that "[m]any of
the records did go with [defendant]" and that defendant never told him that he had
stopped paying Gomez's payroll taxes (R. 429:133). Later, at the restitution hearing,
the prosecutor explained that additional losses were discovered that necessitated a
greater restitution amount (R. 430:16).
Thus the claims underlying the greater restitution amount were not claims
that could have been brought in the civil lawsuit.
22

Therefore, neither claim

preclusion nor issue preclusion applies in this case, and the trial court correctly
ordered restitution not just for the conduct Gomez knew about when he filed his
civil complaint, but for defendant's actual damages to Gomez.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's convictions.
Respectfully submitted May 8,2006.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

MATTHEW D. BATES
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on May 8,2006,1 served two copies of the foregoing Brief
of Appellee upon the defendant/appellant, Val Dean Gibson, by causing them to be
delivered by first-class mail to his counsel of record as follows:
Randall K. Spencer
Fillmore Spencer LLC
3301 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604

24

Addenda

Addendum A

JUL I -12005

' Ti^ . R E C E I V E D

»*%ffi,

***%£*»

By: MARK BAER #5440
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF #4666
Attorney General
Attorney For The State of Utah
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801)366-0199
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
Criminal No. 021912551FS
v.
VAL GIBSON

Judge William M. Barrett

Defendant.
After notice and a hearing in the above cited matter held on May 16, 2005, based upon the
evidence submitted by the Parties, and good cause appearing, the following is hereby Ordered :
1. Restitution to Clark Gomez, aka Gomez Landscaping, Inc. of Mapleton, Utah, shall be in
the amount of $144,702.45, with interest going forward from May 16, 2005 at the legal interest rate
of4.77%.
2. Any payments made by the defendant on the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake City
Judgment entered in Civil Case No. 020904977, entered on about August 23, 2002 by Judge Roger
A. Livingston, up to ihejudgment amount of $59,880.29 shall be credited against the aforementioned
jestitution amount of $144,702.45, plus interest.
3.

In addition and separate to the foregoing, the defendant owes restitution to the Utah State

Tax Commission in the amount of $43,312.36, plus interest at the legal rate of 4.77% going forward
»

from May 16, 2005 on account of unpaid income taxes, subject to possible adjustments based upon
the Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) figures in defendant's federal returns as accepted by the Internal
Revenue Service.
4. The defendant shall file a financial affidavit with the Court, with copies to the State and the
Utah State Tax Commission, on or before May 31, 2005, which affidavit shall include any and all
assets, liabilities, income from every source, and any other relevant financial information, which is
part of, or affects, defendant's current financial situation.
5. The defendant shall obtain full time employment and shall report to the Court and the Utah
State Tax Commission and Adult Probation and Parole all specifics concerning such employment,
including the name of the employer, name of supervisor, and compensation. As previously ordered,
the defendant is proscribed from working as a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) and is further
prohibited from dealing as a fiduciary and/or handling any parties funds, except for his own.
6. The defendant may work under the direct supervision of a CPA on condition that he is
prohibited fiom handling any client's funds in any capacity and may not act as a fiduciary in any
capacity. This condition is subject \p Court review and acceptance- * '

J2:

DATED this /</~ day of

^yjf/pM,

r

Crt*V.

:', 2005. •

William M. Barrett
District CoiltJ-Judge

. "*' <.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I have delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order to:

Randall K. Spencer, Esq.
Fillmore & Spencer, LLC
3301 North University Ave.
Provo, Utah 84604
Mark Baer
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South 5th Fir.
SLC, Utah 84154

F \User\MBAER\Tax\GibsonProposedOrderReRestHeanngMay05 wpd
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Third J.<-'** District

Mark W. Baer - 5440
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF - 4666
Attorney General
Attorneys for State of Utah
Heber Wells Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 366-0199
Facsimile: (801) 366-0268

sriesa.

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
STATEMENT IN ADVANCE
OF PLEA

Plaintiff,
v.
VAL DEAN GIBSON
DOB: 6-24-56

Case No. 021912551

Defendant

COMES NOW, VAL DEAN GIBSON, the defendant in this case and hereby
acknowledges and certifies the following:
I have entered pleas of guilty to the following crime(s):
CRIME
Willful evasion of Income Tax
UCA §76-8-1101(d)

Supplying False or Fraudulent
Information
UCA §76-8-1101 (1)(c)

2nd

DEGREE
PENALTY
Degree Felony

3ra Degree Felony

POSSIBLE
SENTENCE
1-15yrsUSP (Ct: 1)
$1,500 to $25,000 fine
85% surcharge*

0 - 5 Yrs USP (Ct: 4)
$1,000 to $5,000 fine
85% surcharge*

Unlawful Dealing of Property
by a Fiduciary
UCA §76-6-513

2na Degree Felony

1-15YrsUSP (Ct:6)
up to $10000 fine
85% surcharge

Communications Fraud
Of Unlawful Activity

3rd Degree Felony
(as amended)

0- 5 yrs USP
(Ct:8 )
up to $5 ,000 fine
85% surcharge

Class A Misdemeanor

0 - 1 Yrs Jail (Ct: 10)
up to $1,000 fine
85% surcharge

Unlawful and Unprofessional
Conduct UCA §58-1-501/502

* Utah Code § 76-8-1101 indicates that notwithstanding §76-3-301, a fine under UCA §
76-8-1101(1 )(c) shall be no less than $1,000 nor more than $5,000 and that a fine under
UCA § 76-8-1101 (1 )(d) shall be no less than $1,500 nor more than $25,000.

I have received a copy of the charge against me, I have read it, and I
understand the nature and elements of the offense(s) for which I am pleading guilty.
The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as follows:
- (Ct. 1) On or about April 15, 2000 Salt Lake County, I did intentionally or willfully
attempt to evade or defeat a tax or the payment of a tax; to wit, Utah State Income Tax for
tax year 1999.
- (Ct. 4) On or about March 2, 2001 to April 15, 2001, in Salt Lake County, I
supplied false or fraudulent information in the form of a W-2, to the Utah State Tax
Commission, purporting to evidence wages, tips or other compensation, which information
was false or fraudulent.

\u0

- (Ct 6) On or about January 2000 through December, 2001, did deal with property
entrusted to me as a fiduciary in a manner which I knew was a violation of my duty and
which involved a substantial risk of loss or detriment to the owner and the value of the
property exceeded $5,000.00.
- (Ct. 8) On or about December 4 - December 21, 2002, in Salt Lake Count, I did
devise a scheme to defraud Lani Hatch and/or Drywall Surgeons, by means of
communicating false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises, communicated
to Mr. Hatch, and the value of such property was and or purported to be in excess of
$1,000.00.
- (Ct. 10) On different occasions, beginning on or about October 2000 and going
through February 29, 2002 in Salt Lake County, I did practice or engage in conduct,
representing myself to be licensed as a Certified Public Accountant (CPA), an occupation
or profession requiring licensure under Utah Code Title 58, while I was restricted from so
doing by not have an active license at such time.
My conduct, that constitutes the elements of the crime(s) charged are as
follows: During the time periods in question, I was self-employed at Gibson and Company,
Inc, a public accounting operation, located in Sandy, Utah and/or a business by the name
of Valco, Inc, located in Sandy, Utah.

During such employment, I received

income/wages/compensation in excess of the minimum which required me to file a return
and I was obligated to pay some taxes thereupon, which I did not, and thus evaded my
3
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obligation to pay state income taxes.

In addition, during the relevant time period, I

submitted to the Utah State Tax Commission a document or documents purporting to
represent that I had income in excess of $2.6 million (dollars) and sought a refund on
account of same.

Further, acting in the capacity of an accountant and/or finance

professional, I accepted in excess of $5,000.00 from Clark Gomez, and/or Gomez
Landscaping for the purposes of accounting, reporting and turning over said funds to
appropriate tax authorities, and I did not properly account, report and turnover the same.
Still further, during the relevant time period, I used letterhead that indicated that I was a
Certified Public Accountant (CPA) and/or held myself out to be a Certified Public
Accountant despite the fact that my license had expired. Finally, during the time period in
question, I did accept funds from a Lani Hatch, who was doing business as Drywall
Surgeons in excess of $1,000.00 and did not properly, completely or fully communicate to
Mr. Hatch where those exact funds were going and/or to what purpose they were used or
were to be used.
1 am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with complete knowledge and
understanding of the following facts and representations, in conjunction with those
communicated to me by my counsel:
I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot
afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I recognize that a
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condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount, as determined by the
court, to recoup the cost of counsel if so appointed for me.
I have not waived my right to counsel. My attorney is Scott Williams, Esquire.
I have had an opportunity to discuss this Statement, my rights and the consequences of
my guilty plea(s) with my attorney.
I know that I have a right to a speedy trial and also a trial by jury, or if waived,
a trial in front of a judge acting as a finder of fact, and that in the case of a jury, the jury
would have to be unanimous in order to convict.
I know that if I wish to have a trial, I have the right to confront and crossexamine witnesses against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorney. I also
know that I have the right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense to testify
in court on my behalf if I could not so afford to do.
" ^ y ~ 5 . I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf, but if I choose not to do
so, I can not be compelled to testify or give evidence against myself and no adverse
inferences will be drawn against me if I do not testify.
^«

6. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me, I need only plead "not

guilty" and the matter will be set for trial, at which time the State of Utah will have the
burden of proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is
before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous.

^ 7 .

know that under the Constitution of Utah, if I were tried and convicted by a jury

or by a judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah
Court of Appeals or, where allowed, to the Supreme Court of Utah, and that if I could not
afford to pay the costs and attorney fees for such appeal, those expenses would be paid
by the State. I further understand that by entering a plea at this time, that I will enjoy only
limited rights of appeal, particularly as compared to those rights I might have after a trial.
'yU?

8. I know the maximum possible sentence that may be imposed for each offense

to which I plead guilty. I know that the sentence may be for a prison term, a fine, or both.
I know that in addition to any fine, a 85% surcharge, required by Utah Code Annotated §
63-63a-1, will be imposed. I also know that I may be ordered by the Court to make
restitution to any victim or victims of my crime and that the State will be asking for such.
I know that imprisonment or probation may be for consecutive periods, for this
case or with respect to any other case in which I am presently involved, and/or as concerns
the fine. I also know that if I am incarcerated, on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing
on another offense of which I have been convicted or to which I have pleaded guilty, my
plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me.
fy/

10. I know and understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my statutory and

constitutional rights set out in the preceding paragraphs. I know that by entering such
plea(s), I admit that I have committed the conduct alleged and I am guilty of the crime(s)
for which my plea(s) is/are entered. I understand that any motion to withdraw my plea(s)

n

of guilty must be filed with the court within 30 days after my sentencing and that any right
to appeal after the entering of a plea(s) would be much more limited than an appeal after
a trial by jury or by the Court.

•&z

11. My plea(s) of guilty is the result of a plea bargain between myself and the State.

The promises, duties and provisions of this plea bargain, include the following:
- The State has agreed to dismiss all counts with prejudice to which I am not
entering a plea and will agree not to file any additional criminal tax charges arising out of
the activity, or like kind criminal activity as it relates to tax, that has occurred or may have
occurred on or before the date of this Agreement - subject to the any and all conditions as
stated in this document and/or any Court order in this case;
-1 will keep the Court appraised of my current address and any changes in that
address within five (5) days of any change and I also understand and agree that any further
filings and/or pleadings, including any notices, requests or show cause proceedings
initiated by the State may be served upon my counsel of record;
-1 agree that criminal restitution for unpaid state taxes and for losses to private
victims will be requested by the State and may be entered in this case for all years, not just
the years on tax year(s) for which I am pleading. Such restitution may include appropriate
penalties and/or interest.
-1 agree that the State is seeking and/or may seek as criminal restitution, amounts
not only for the counts for which I am entering pleas, but also for those counts which, in
accordance with this agreement are being dismissed, including restitution to all private
individual(s).
-1 understand that the State firmly believes as of the time of the entering of this
Statement that restitution to private victim Gomez will be at or above 44£§?000r
Furthermore, the State believes that restitution is owed to private victim Hatch in excess
of $50,000, although the defendant may have legitimate offsets which the State agrees to
consider, review and acknowledge if legitimate, and further that the State will consider
recommending that the conviction on Count 8 be adjusted downward by the Court if said
offsets result in an outstanding restitution balance on said Count 8 amounts to less than
$1,000.00.

\JJL-£>
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- I understand that if evidence is found and presented at a future time which
exonerates me from the charges to which I have plead guilty, said charges may be
reviewed by the Court.
- I understand that the Utah State Tax Commission's criminal investigation unit
agrees to review for investigation of and/or refer to appropriate investigation agency(ies)
any person known or suspected by the defendant to have violated any provisions of the
Utah Criminal Code.
-1 agree to cooperate with any federal authorities in determining what tax liability I
may have with regard to federal taxes for any years not so bared for consideration under
federal law or rule as of the date of the entering of this plea.
-1 agree to fully cooperate in any proceedings with the Utah State Tax Commission formal or informal - to determine liability, if any, I may have with respect to any tax liabilities
I may owe, for whatever year(s) as requested by said Commission.
-1 agree to cooperate with the Utah Department of Professional Licensing (DOPL)
and/or any other authorities in any further review of my acting as a Certified Public
Accountant and/or my holding out so to be when I was not so licensed.
- I understand that the State will recommend a fine in the low range of that
applicable by law and will recommend probation, which may or will likely contain as a
condition of probation a jail sentence, at least at the first scheduled sentencing date in this
case, assuming that I, the defendant, have complied with any and all pre-sentencing
conditions either as contained in this document and as accepted by the Court at the time
of the change of plea hearing.

w_

12. Other conditions specifically reviewed and approved by me are as follows:

- I must truthfully cooperate with Utah State Tax Commission authorities in
determining my liabilities, if any, thereto and arranging a repayment plan where applicable;
-1 must truthfully file any past (from this date) state tax return as requested by the
Utah State Tax Commission (USTC), and absolutely must file all current, and future tax
returns as a condition of any sentence in this case, both as to personal and business
returns if applicable, as required by the USTC and/or state law, and I will have to pay any
taxes, penalties and/or interest that may arise from this obligation;

8

- I must cooperate with the USTC in any further non-criminal hearing to review
and/or determine my personal/business tax status and/or tax liabilities or any persons or
entities with whom I have represented or purported to represent.
-1 understand that the State will ask that I perform a community service obligation
of 250 hours if I am placed on probation by the sentencing Court.
- The State acknowledges that in the event that the defendant is placed on any
condition of probation in this case, that the State will agree to review this case at the time
of the end of the probationary period, or any extensions thereto unless such extensions are
due to the defendant's non-cooperation, lor the purpose of considering any motion that
might be filed by the defendant in the nature of a 402 motion, in order to have the
defendants convictions reduced and the State will not oppose such a one step reduction
so long as the defendant has fully complied with any and all conditions placed upon him by
this Agreement and the Court at sentencing and/or by the Court at anytime thereafter.

wr 13. I further realize that I must be truthful and honest in all representations made to
any Court dealing with this case and also to any Adult Probation and Parole Officer
assigned to conduct a Pre-Sentence Investigation and/or as assigned to this case in the
event that I am placed on probation, and that I must appear for sentencing in this case, and
that a failure any of these regards, will free the State from any limitations as to the State's
recommendations in this case as laid out in this agreement, particularly with respect to any
recommendations regarding incarceration.
lyT

14. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or recommendation of

probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges, made or sought by
either my defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the Judge. I also
know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the court may do are
also not binding on the Court.

9
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15. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to induce
me to plead guilty; no promises except those contained herein have been made to me.
16.

I've read this Statement or had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand

its provisions.

I know that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this

Statement. I do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements contained
therein are correct. Further, I understand that this Statement has been jointly created by
myself and the State and nothing shall be construed against either party on the basis of the
source or creation of this document.
17. I'm satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
us*''

18.1 am T o years of age; I have attended school through the Ug^ grade and I

can read and understand the English language. I was/am not under the influence of any
drugs, medication or intoxicants when the decision to enter the plea(s) was made. I am not
presently under the influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants which impair my
judgment.
19. I believe myself to be of a sound and discerning mind, mentally capable of
understanding the proceedings and the consequences of my plea and free of any mental
disease, defect or impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily entering my plea.
DATED this'?"day of ^ j l f , , 2004.

DEFENDANT
10
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CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY

I certify that I am the attorney for Val Dean Gibson, the defendant above, and
that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her and I have
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and
belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual
synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the
other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing statement,
are accurate and true.

FOR DEFENDANT

11
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CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

1 certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against Val
Dean Gibson, defendant. I have reviewed this statement of the defendant and find that the
declarations, including the elements of the offense of the charge(s) and the factual
synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense are true and
correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea have been
offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the statement or as
supplemented on the record before the court. There is reasonable cause to believe that
the evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the
plea(s) is/are entered and acceptance of the plea(s)/would serve the public interest.

¥*Sttto
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

12

ORDER
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement and certification, the
court finds the defendant's plea(s) of guilty is freely and voluntarily made and it is so
ordered that the defendant's plea(s) of guilty to the charge(s) set forth in the statement be
accepted and entered.
DONE IN COURT this 71

day of
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GOMEZ LANDSCAPING, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

(0
v

COMPLAINT

civil No.

VAL GIBSON,

Defendant,

Judge [^.c

fl^&yfly?77
U\/\JDL
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Plaintiff, Gomez Landscaping, Inc., a Utah corporation, alleges as follows:
1.

Plaintiff is a Utah Corporation with it principal office in Utah County, Utah.

2.

Defendant is a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah.

3.

The Defendant is a certified Public Accountant who was employed by the Plaintiff

to perform accounting services for the Plaintiff during the years 1999, 2000, and 2001.
4.

The Plaintiff relied on the Defendant to prepare and file all of its payroll taxes.

5.

During the year 2001 the Defendant requested the Plaintiff to make payments

covering all of the payroll taxes directly to the Defendant, with the understanding that the
Defendant would then make out the checks to pay the payroll taxes to the Internal Revenue
Service and the Utah State Tax Commission.

-^ip

6.

During trie diird quarter of 2001 the Plaintiff delivered directly to the Defendant

Checks made payable to the Defendant in the amount of the payroll taxes, which totaled
approximatelx$50,000m
7.

During the Fourth Quarter of 2001 the Plaintiff delivered directly to the Defendant

Checks made payable to the Defendant in the amount of the payroll taxes, which totaled
approximateK^WOO.OO.
8.

The Defendant wrongfully represented to the Plaintiff that it should make the

payments for the withholding taxes directly to the Defendant in order for the Defendant to make
the payments to the Internal Revenue Service and the Utah State Tax Commission.
9.

The Defendant knew that it was not necessary for the Plaintiff to make the tax

payment directly to the Defendant, but that the normal procedure would have been for the
Defendant to prepare the necessaiy tax forms and then inform the Plaintiff of the tax due or give
the returns to the Plaintiff who would then make its payment directly to the Internal Revenue
Service and the Utah State Tax Commission.
10.

The Defendant intentionally had the Plaintiff give the monies to him so that the

Defendant would have control of the same.
11.

The Plaintiff acted reasonably and in ignorance of the Defendant's real purpose

for having the monies paid directly to the Defendant.
12.

The Plaintiff in reliance on the representations of the Defendant paid directly to

the Defendant the sum of Fifty-Nine Thousai^^59,000.00jdollars. Defendant represented to
Plaintiff that he would use these funds to pay the Internal Revenue Service and the Utah State
Tax Commission on behalf of the Plaintiff.

«**~^
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1 he Plaintui in reliance on the representations of the Defendant made the

payments directly to the Defendant.
14.

The Defendant did not make the payments to the Internal Revenue Serivce and the

Utah State Tax Commission as he had said he would do. Instead, he converted the funds he
received from Plaintiff to his own use and benefit.
15.

The Plaintiff was contacted by the Internal Revenue Service and informed that it

had not received the monthly deposits of approximately $12,000.00 the last 2 months in the
fourth quarter, nor the sum of approximately $27,000.00 for the third quarter of 2001.
16.

Because the Defendant did not make the payments he said he would make on

behalf of Plaintiff, the Plaintiff has been required to pay to the Internal Revenue Service the sum
of $51,000.00 plus interest and penalties totaling„$2L000.00.
17.

The Plaintiff has also been required to pay to the Utah state Tax Commission the

sum of $6,000.00 for the third and fourth quarters of 2001.
18.

The Plaintiff has attempted to reach the Defendant to obtain copies of the tax

forms which the Defendant prepared and to have him return the monies which he wrongfully
convert to his own use which belonged to the Plaintiff, but has not been successful in so doing.
19.

The Defendant has refused and failed to deliver copies of the tax returns to the

Plaintiff or to refund the monies which he converted to his own use and benefit.
20.

In addition the IRS hasjilacea tax lien on the equipment owned by Gomez

Equipment, Inc. in the amount^£$8,400.00 fo^Aaxes which the Plaintiff is informed were
wrongfully applied to the account of the Plaintiff.

3

Fraudulent Conversion
21.

The Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1-20

as if fUlly set forth herein.
22.

The Defendant wrongfully converted all of the monies which the Plaintiff

deposited with him for the payment of its payroll taxes to the Internal Revenue Service and the
Utah State Tax Commission to his own use and benefit.
23.

The Plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of Fifty-Nine Thousand ($59,000.00),

or such other amount as may be actually determined at trial, plus costs, reasonable attorneys fees
and interest.
Conversion
24.

The Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1-23

as if fully set forth herein.
25.

The Defendant has willfully interfered with the monies belonging to the Plaintiff.

26.

The Defendant, without lawful justification, used the Plaintiffs money for his

own use and benefit.
27.

The acts of theT)efendant have deprived the Plaintiff of the use and benefit of its

money.
Conversion
28.

The Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1-29

as if fully set forth herein.
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29.

The Defendant's actions are the result of willful and malicious or fraudulent

conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard
of, the rights of others.
30.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive

damages in an amount to be proved at trial, but which shall not be less than three times the
amount of compensatory and general damages awarded at trial.
WHEREFORE the Plaintiff request that judgment as follows:
1.

For the fraudulent conversion of the sum of fifty-nine thousand ($59,000.00)

2.

For costs, including reasonable attorneys fees and interest as provided by law.

3.

For punitive damages.

4.

For an order of this Court requiring the Defendant to deliver to the Plaintiff all

dollars.

books and records that belonging to the Plaintiff, together with all records that the defendant has
prepared on behalf of the Plaintiff.
5.

For such other and further relief as the court may determine to be just and

equitable in the premises.
Dated this 7th day of June, 2002.
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR

fc

Richard C. Ckhoon
David W. Tufts
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Plaintiffs address:
1737 Fairway Lane
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660

"J:,7f.:^T

David W. Tufts (8736)
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:'(801)415-3000
Fax: (801) 415-3500
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GOMEZ LANDSCAPING, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiffs,

AMENDED COMPLAINT

vs.
Civil No. 020904977
VAL GIBSON,
Defendant,

Judge Livingston

Plaintiff, Gomez Landscaping, Inc., a Utah corporation, alleges as follows:
1.

Plaintiff is a Utah Corporation with it principal office in Utah County, Utah.

2.

Defendant is a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah.

3.

The Defendant is a certified Public Accountant who was employed by the Plaintiff

to perform accounting services for the Plaintiff during the years 1999, 2000, and 2001.
4.

The Plaintiff relied on the Defendant to prepare and file all of its payroll taxes.

5.

During the year 2001 the Defendant requested the Plaintiff to make payments

covering all of the payroll taxes directly to the Defendant, with the understanding that the
Defendant would then make out the checks to pay the payroll taxes to the Internal Revenue
Service and the Utah State Tax Commission.

6.

During uic diird quarter of 2001 the Plaintiff delivered directly to the Defendant

Checks made payable to the Defendant in the amount of the payroll taxes, which totaled
approximately $30,000.00.
7.

During the Fourth Quarter of 2001 the Plaintiff delivered directly to the Defendant

Checks made payable to the Defendant in the amount of the payroll taxes, which totaled
approximately $30,000.00.
8.

The Defendant wrongfully represented to the Plaintiff that it should make the

payments for the withholding taxes directly to the Defendant in order for the Defendant to make
the payments to the Internal Revenue Service and the Utah State Tax Commission.
9.

The Defendant knew that it was not necessary for the Plaintiff to make the tax

payment directly to the Defendant, but that the normal procedure would have been for the
Defendant to prepare the necessary tax forms and then inform the Plaintiff of the tax due or give
the returns to the Plaintiff who would then make its payment directly to the Internal Revenue
Service and the Utah State Tax Commission.
10.

The Defendant intentionally had the Plaintiff give the monies to him so that the

Defendant would have control of the same.
11.

The Plaintiff acted reasonably and in ignorance of the Defendant's real purpose

for having the monies paid directly to the Defendant.
12.

The Plaintiff in reliance on the representations of the Defendant paid directly to

the Defendant the sum of Fifty-Nine Thousand ($59,000.00) dollars. Defendant represented to
Plaintiff that he would use these funds to pay the Internal Revenue Service and the Utah State
Tax Commission on behalf of the Plaintiff.
2

13.

The Plamaff in reliance on the representations of the Defendant made the

payments directly to the Defendant.
14.

The Defendant did not make the payments to the Internal Revenue Serivce and the

Utah State Tax Commission as he had said he would do. Instead, he converted the funds he
received from Plaintiff to his own use and benefit.
15.

The Plaintiff was contacted by the Internal Revenue Service and informed that it

had not received the monthly deposits of approximately $12,000.00 the last 2 months in the
fourth quarter, nor the sum of approximately $27,000.00 for the third quarter of 2001.
16.

Because the Defendant did not make the payments he said he would make on

behalf of Plaintiff, the Plaintiff has been required to pay to the Internal Revenue Service the sum
of $51,000.00 plus interest and penalties totaling $2,000.00.
17.

The Plaintiff has also been required to pay to the Utah state Tax Commission the

sum of $6,000.00 for the third and fourth quarters of 2001.
18.

The Plaintiff has attempted to reach the Defendant to obtain copies of the tax

forms which the Defendant prepared and to have him return the monies which he wrongfully
convert to his own use which belonged to the Plaintiff, but has not been successful in so doing.
19.

The Defendant has refused and failed to deliver copies of the tax returns to the

Plaintiff or to refund the monies which he converted to his own use and benefit.
20.

In addition the IRS has place a tax lien on the equipment owned by Gomez

Equipment, Inc. in the amount of $8,400.00 for taxes which the Plaintiff is informed were
wrongfully applied to the account of the Plaintiff

3

Fraudulent Conversion
21.

The Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 -20

as if fully set forth herein.
22.

The Defendant wrongfully converted all of the monies which the Plaintiff

deposited with him for the payment of its payroll taxes to the Internal Revenue Service and the
Utah State Tax Commission to his own use and benefit.
23.

The Plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of Fifty-Nine Thousand ($59,000.00),

or such other amount as may be actually determined at trial, plus costs, reasonable attorneys fees
and interest.
Conversion
24.

The Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1-23

as if fully set forth herein.
25.

The Defendant has willfully interfered with the monies belonging to the Plaintiff.

26.

The Defendant, without lawful justification, used the Plaintiffs money for his

own use and benefit.
27.

The acts of the Defendant have deprived the Plaintiff of the use and benefit of its

money.
Punitive Damages
28.

The Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1-29

as if fully set forth herein.
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29.

The Defendant's actions are the result of willful and malicious or fraudulent

conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard
of, the rights of others.
30.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive

damages in an amount to be proved at trial, but which shall not be less than three times the
amount of compensatory and general damages awarded at trial.
WHEREFORE the Plaintiff request that judgment as follows:
1.

For the fraudulent conversion of the sum of fifty-nine thousand ($59,000.00)

2.

For costs, including reasonable attorneys fees and interest as provided by law.

3.

For punitive damages.

4.

For an order of this Court requiring the Defendant to deliver to the Plaintiff all

dollars.

books and records that belonging to the Plaintiff, together with all records that the defendant has
prepared on behalf of the Plaintiff.
5.

For such other and further relief as the court may determine to be just and

equitable in the premises.
Dated this 11th day of June, 2002.
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR

Richard C. C4hoon
David W. Tufts
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Plaintiffs address:
1737 Fairway Lane
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660
5
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Richard C. Cahoon (A535)
David W. Tufts (8736)
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 415-3000
Fax: (801) 415-3500
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GOMEZ LANDSCAPING, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO ENTER DEFAULT
JUDGMENT AND AWARD
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

vs.
Civil No. 020904977
VAL GIBSON,
Defendant,

Judge Livingston

The Plaintiff submits the following memorandum in support of its motion for an award
of punitive damages:
FACTS
1.

In 1999 the Plaintiff employed the Defendant Val Gibson as a certified public

accountant (CPA) to handle the accounting work for its business.
2.

The Defendant was to prepare the payroll checks for all the Plaintiffs employees

and withhold all income taxes, both state and federal, the social security taxes, and the medicare
taxes due on the Plaintiffs bi-monthly payroll.
3.

The defendant was to prepare the form 941 and then deposit the federal incomes

withlield from the employees checks together with the social security taxes and medicare taxes
withlield with Internal Revenue Service.
1
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4.

The Defendant was also to deposit with the Utah State Commission the State

Income taxes withheld from the all of the Plaintiffs employees' salary.
5.

The Defendant was also to deposit with the Utah Department of Work Force

Services the Plaintiffs unemployment insurance contribution for all of the Plaintiffs employees.
6.

The Defendant requested and received from the Plaintiff a check every two weeks

in an amount that would allow the Defendant to not only pay the employees' salaries, but also
pay all of the necessary deposits and pay the Plaintiffs share of the social security, medicare
taxes, and insurance contributions.
7.

The Defendant properly performed all of these services which he represented he

would do throughout the latter part of the year 1999 and all of 2000.
8.

The Defendant was to continued to perform these same services in 2001 and

based on the amounts he requested, the Plaintiff delivered to the Defendant checks bi-monthly in
an amount that would allow the Defendant to not only pay the employees' salaries, but to pay all
of the necessary deposits and pay the Plaintiffs share of the social security, medicare taxes, and
insurance contributions. A copy of the checks paid to the Defendant in 2001, totaling
$309,130.70 is attached hereto as exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference.
9.

The Plaintiff relied on the Defendant to continue to prepare, deposit and file all of

the other taxes and forms as required in 2001 as he had done in the year 2000; however in the
month of November 2001, the President of the Plaintiff was contacted by the Internal Revenue
Service and informed that they had not received any deposits for income taxes, social security or
medicare taxes, nor had they received the Plaintiffs necessary tax forms covering the same for
the year 2001.
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10.

The Plaintiff contacted the Defendant regarding the Defendant's failure to

perform the accounting services agreed upon, but the Defendant failed and refused to provided
the forms or any explanation of why he had not deposited the taxes or filed the necessary tax
forms.
11.

As a result it became necessary for the Plaintiff to deposit with the Internal

Revenue Service and Utah State Tax Commission an additional sum of fifty-seven thousand
dollars ($57,000.00) which the Plaintiff had in fact paid to the Defendant which the Defendant
wrongfully and intentionally had fraudulently converted to his own use and benefit which had
been given to him in order to pay the taxes owed by the Plaintiff to the Internal Revenue Service
and the Utah State Tax Commission, plus the sum of two thousand dollars($2000.00) in penalties
and interest to the LR.S.
ARGUMENT
The actions of the Defendant in fraudulently converting the Plaintiffs money to his own
use and benefit was a willful and malicious act on the part of the Defendant. The conduct of the
Defendant in knowingly and willfully taking the money which the Plaintiff had delivered to him
to pay its payroll and payroll taxes is the type of action for which this court should impose
punitive damages. The Utah Court of appeals set out the factors which this Court should consider
in determining the amount of punitive damages, in the case of Arnica Mutual Insurance Company
v. Schettler 768 P2d 950 (Utah App 1989):
A trial court should consider seven factors in assessing the amount of punitive
damages: (1) the relative wealth of the defendant, (2) the nature of the alleged
misconduct, (3) the facts and circumstance surrounding the misconduct, (4) the
effect thereof upon the lives of the plaintiff and others, (5) the probability of
future recurrence of the misconduct, (6) the relationship between the parties, and
(7) the amount of actual damages awarded.
3

As indicated in the facts, we know the nature of the alleged misconduct came as a result
of the reliance and trust which the Plaintiff placed in the Defendant based upon the fact that he
was a CPA and that he had been working for the Plaintiff and had successfully performed his
services in the prior year. The Defendant was given monies to make the necessary tax deposits
with the Internal Revenue Service and the Utah State Tax Commission and he fraudulently
converted these monies for his own use and benefit The actions of the Defendant caused the
Plaintiff to incur penalties and interest of $2,000.00 on the sum of fifty-one thousand dollars
($51,000.00) it owed to the I.R.S. in addition to having to pay the sum of fifty-one thousand
dollars ($51,000.00) twice. The effect of the Defendant's actions was to cause the Plaintiff who
had relied on the Defendant to perform the services for which he had been employed to suffer the
embarrassment of having the I.R.S. inform it that its taxes had not been paid and to come up with
an additional fifty-three thousand dollars ($53,000.00), including penalties and interest, with
which to pay the unpaid taxes. The Plaintiff was also required to pay the Utah State Tax
Commission the sum of six thousand dollars ($6,000.00) in unpaid state income tax that was
owed on its employees salaries which the Defendant had converted to his own use and benefit.
The Plaintiff is still trying to sort out the mess that the Defendant created, and has had to hire a
new accountant to recreate and prepare its necessary tax returns for the year 2001.
The Defendant's actions of fraudulently converting money which he had been given in a
position of trust for his own use and benefit, violated the trust which the Plaintiff placed in the
Defendant and the Defendant's profession. The breach of this trust is the very type of action for
which the concept of punitive damages was developed to correct. The Defendant should not be
allowed to ignore this type of conduct with only the obligation to repay the actual damages, but
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a punitive damages should be imposed to teach the Defendant that the type of conduct will not
be tolerated.
We do not know the Defendant's personal net worth, but we do know that he is fiftyseven thousand dollars ($57,000.00) to the good, as a result of this fraudulent conversion. The
Courts have indicated that there is no fixed formula for determining the"reasonableness" of a
punitive damage award. Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P2d 723, 727 (Utah 1983). In the case of Van
Dyke v. Mountain Coin Mack DisL, 758 P.2d 962, 966 (Utah Ct. App.1988) the Court allowed a
punitive damage award that was 50 times greater than the actual damage award. "The nature of
the conduct should be carefully considered when reviewing the relationship between actual and
punitive damages and a higher multiple allowed to punish clearly outrageous conduct. Punitive
damages are intended to punish and "to take the profit out of wrongdoing". Arnica v. Schettler at
975.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the facts of this case are such that the court should enter a judgment in
the sum of fifty-nine thousand dollars ($59,000.00) plus interest from the date funds were
wrongfully converted in actual dollars and punitive damages in an equal amount.
Respectfully submitted thi So?£? day of July,

David Tufts
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This will certify that on t h e ^ ^ d a y of July, 2002,1 served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ENTER DEFAULT
JUDGMENT AND AWARD PUNITIVE DAMAGES upon the following party by depositing
the same in the United States mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Mr. Val Gibson
99 Lone Hollow Drive
Sandy, Utah 84092
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FILES DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

RICHARD C. CAHOON (A535)
David W. Tufts (8736)
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 415-3000
Facsimile: (801) 415-3500

AUG 23 2002

ENTERED IN REGISTRY

OFJUPfityENTS
DATE

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GOMEZ LANDSCAPING, INC., a Utah
corporation,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 020904977
VAL GIBSON,
Judge Livingston
Defendant.

The Plaintiffs Motion to enter Default Judgment and Award Punitive Damages
came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable Roger Livingston on August 9, 2002. The
Plaintiffs President Clark Gomez and Counsel Richard C. Cahoon were present, the Defendant
did not appear. The Defendant was aware of the Hearing, having faxed a letter to the Plaintiffs
President early this morning regarding the hearing. The Court having reviewed the pleading and
being fully advised of the fraudulent actions of the Defendant in breaching his fiduciary duty as a
CPA, and taking Judicial Notice that the conduct of the Defendant Val Gibson's manifested a
knowing and reckless indifference toward and disregard of the rights of the Plaintiff in the breach
of his fiduciary duty as a CPA, now enters the following Judgement:

020904977

G|BS0N VAL

JD

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Judgement be entered
against the Defendant Val Gibson for his fraudulent actions for and on behalf of the Plaintiff in
the Sum of Fifty-nine Thousand eight hundred eighty dollars and twenty nine cents ($59,880.29)
plus all interest and additional penalties imposed by the IRS or the Utah Tax Commission, as
shall be determined by an affidavit signed by the Plaintiffs President setting forth the penalties
and interest assessed, and punitive damages in the sum of Sixty Thousand dollars ($60,000.00).
Together, with all Court Costs, fees and attorneys fees incurred in the Collection of said
Judgement.
Dated this ^ J L d a y of August 2002.

-n7?

1 J 7vicr

Richard C. Cahoon (A535)
David W. Tufts (8736)
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)415-3000
Fax:(801)415-3500
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GOMEZ LANDSCAPING, INC. , a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiffs,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

vs.
Civil No. 020904977

VAL GIBSON,
Defendant,

Judge Livingston

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the Affidavit and Judgment in the
above-referenced matter this o p

day of August, 2002, postage prepaid to:

Mr. Val Gibson
99 Lone Hollow Drive
Sandy, Utah 84092
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Addendum D

Wesf?aw
Page 1
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-101

C
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
K
d Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos)
K
M Part 1. General Provisions
-•§ 77-38a-101. Title
This chapter is known as the "Crime Victims Restitution Act."
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 2, eff. April 30, 2001.
CROSS REFERENCES
Crime Victims Reparations Act, reparations not to supplant restitution, see §
63-25a-403.
Pleas in abeyance, manner, see § 77-2a-3.
Restitution, reparations not to supplant restitution, see § 63-25a-403.
Sentencing, see § 76-3-201 et seq.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR Library
15 A.L.R.5th 391, Measure and Elements of Restitution to "Which Victim is Entitled
Under State Criminal Statute.
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-101, UT ST § 77-38a-101

Current through end of 2005 Second Special Session

Copr © 2006 Thomson/West

END OF DOCUMENT
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Wfcstlaw
Page 1
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-102

C
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
*Hl Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos)
*S Part 1. General Provisions
-•§ 77-38a-102. Definitions
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Conviction" includes a:
(a) judgment of guilt;
(b) a plea of guilty; or
(c) a plea of no contest.

(2) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or
any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the
sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct.
(3) "Department" means the Department of Corrections.
(4) "Diversion" means suspending criminal proceedings prior to conviction on the
condition that a defendant agree to participate in a rehabilitation program, make
restitution to the victim, or fulfill some other condition.
(5)
"Party"
prosecution.

means

the

prosecutor,

defendant,

or

department

involved

in

a

(6) "Pecuniary damages" means all demonstrable economic injury, whether or not yet
incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the facts
or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the fair
market value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses
including lost earnings and medical expenses, but excludes punitive or exemplary
damages and pain and suffering.

(7) "Plea agreement" means an agreement entered between the prosecution and
defendant setting forth the special terms and conditions and criminal charges upon
which the defendant will enter a plea of guilty or no contest.
(8) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the prosecution
and the defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant
but not, at that time, entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing
sentence upon him on condition that he comply with specific conditions as set
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

http://print.westlaw.com/delivery.html?dest=atp&format=HTMLE&dataid
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Page 2
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-102
forth in a plea in abeyance agreement.
(9) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into between the
prosecution and the defendant setting forth the specific terms and conditions upon
which, following acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea may be held in
abeyance.
(10) "Plea disposition" means an agreement entered into between the prosecution
and defendant including diversion, plea agreement, plea in abeyance agreement, or
any agreement by which the defendant may enter a plea in any other jurisdiction or
where charges are dismissed without a plea.
(11) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages
to a victim, including prejudgment interest, the accrual of interest from the time
of sentencing, insured damages, reimbursement for payment of a reward, and payment
for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as may
be further defined by law.
(12)(a) "Reward" means a sum of money:
(i) offered to the public for information leading to the arrest and conviction
of an offender; and
(ii) that has been paid to a person or persons who provide this information,
except that the person receiving the payment may not be a codefendant, an
accomplice, or a bounty hunter.
(b) "Reward" does not include any amount paid in excess of the sum offered to the
public.
(13) "Screening" means the process used by a prosecuting attorney to terminate
investigative action, proceed with prosecution, move to dismiss a prosecution that
has been commenced, or cause a prosecution to be diverted.
(14) (a) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities.
(b) "Victim" may not include a codefendant or accomplice.
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 3, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2003, c. 278, § 2, eff. May 5,
2003; Laws 2005, c. 96, § 3, eff. May 2, 2005.
NOTES OF DECISIONS
Coparticipant 1
Insurers 2
Police 3
Victim 4
1. Coparticipant
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

http://print.westlaw.comydeliveiy.html?dest=atp&format=HTMLE&dataid=AO

5/8/2006

Westlaw
110kl222.1

Page 1

U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-201

West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
K
M Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos)
*afl Part 2. Restitution Determination
-*§
77-38a-201.
responsibilities

Restitution

determination—Law

enforcement

duties

and

Any law enforcement agency conducting an investigation for criminal conduct which
would
constitute
a felony
or
class A misdemeanor
shall provide
in the
investigative reports whether a claim for restitution exists, the basis for the
claim, and the estimated or actual amount of the claim.
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 4, eff. April 30, 2001.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Criminal Law kl222.1.
Westlaw Key Number Search: 110kl222.1.
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-201, UT ST § 77-38a-201

Current through end of 2005 Second Special Session

Copr © 2006 Thomson/West

END OF DOCUMENT
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Vfetlaw
Page 1
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-202

West T s Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
*fi Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos)
*i Part 2. Restitution Determination
-•§
77-38a-202.
responsibilities

Restitution

determination—Prosecution

duties

and

(1) At the time of entry of a conviction or entry of any plea disposition of a
felony or class A misdemeanor, the attorney general, county attorney, municipal
attorney, or district attorney shall provide to the district court:
(a) the names
restitution;

of

all

victims,

including

third

parties,

asserting

claims

for

(b) the actual or estimated amount of restitution determined at that time; and
(c) whether or not the defendant
part of the plea disposition.

has

agreed

to pay

the

(2) In computing actual or estimated restitution, the
attorney, municipal attorney, or district attorney shall:

restitution

attorney

specified

general,

(a) use the criteria set forth in Section 77-38a-302 for establishing
amounts; and

as

county

restitution

(b) in cases involving multiple victims, incorporate into any conviction or plea
disposition all claims for restitution arising out of the investigation for which
the defendant is charged.
(3) If charges are not to be prosecuted as part of a plea disposition, restitution
claims from victims of those crimes shall also be provided to the court.
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 5, eff. April 30, 2001.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
District and Prosecuting Attorneys C ^ S •
Sentencing and Punishment €=^2162.
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 131k8; 350Hk2162.
C.J.S. District and Prosecuting Attorneys §§ 20 to 21, 29 to 30.
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-202, UT ST § 77-38a-202
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U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-202
Current through end of 2005 Second Special Session

Copr © 2006 Thomson/West
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U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-203

West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
*ii Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos)
*& Part 2. Restitution Determination
-•§
77-38a-203.
Restitution
Presentence investigation

determination—Department

of

Corrections —

(1) (a) The department
shall prepare a presentence
investigation report in
accordance with Subsection 77-18-1(5). The prosecutor and law enforcement agency
involved shall provide all available victim information to the department upon
request. The victim impact statement shall:
(i) identify all victims of the offense;
(ii) itemize
offense;

any

economic

loss

suffered

by

the

victim

as

a

result

of

the

(iii) include for each identifiable victim a specific statement of the
recommended amount of complete restitution as defined in Section 77-38a-302,
accompanied by a recommendation from the department regarding the payment by
the defendant of court-ordered restitution with interest as defined in Section
77-38a-302;
(iv) identify any physical, mental, or emotional injuries suffered
victim as a result of the offense, and the seriousness and permanence;
(v) describe any change in the victim's
relationships as a result of the offense;

personal

welfare

or

by

the

familial

(vi) identify any request for mental health services initiated by the victim or
the victim's family as a result of the offense; and
(vii) contain any other information related to the impact of the offense upon
the victim or the victim 1 s family that the court requires.
(b) The crime victim shall be responsible to provide to the department upon
request all invoices, bills, receipts, and other evidence of injury, loss of
earnings, and out-of-pocket loss. The crime victim shall also provide upon
request:
(i) all documentation and evidence of compensation or reimbursement from
insurance companies or agencies of the state of Utah, any other state, or
federal government received as a direct result of the crime for injury, loss,
earnings, or out-of-pocket loss; and
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(ii) proof of identification, including date of birth, Social Security number,
drivers license number, next of kin, and home and work address and telephone
numbers.
(c) The inability, failure, or refusal of the crime victim to provide all or part
of the requested information shall result in the court determining restitution
based on the best information available.
(2) (a) The
court
shall
order the defendant
as part
of the
presentence
investigation to submit to the department any information determined necessary to
be disclosed for the purpose of ascertaining the restitution.
(b) The willful failure or refusal of the defendant to provide all or part of the
requisite information shall constitute a waiver of any grounds to appeal or seek
future amendment or alteration of the restitution order predicated on the
undisclosed information.
(c) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the
restitution recommended in the presentence investigation, the court shall set a
hearing date to resolve the matter.
(d) If any party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation
report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived.
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 6, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2005, c. 96, § 4, eff. May 2,
2005.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Sentencing and Punishment €=^286, 299.
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 350Hk286; 350Hk299.
C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1506.
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-203, UT ST § 77-38a-203
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
K<
M Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos)
K
M Part 3. Restitution Requirements
-•§ 77-38a-301. Restitution—Convicted defendant may be required to pay
In a criminal
restitution.

action,

the

court

may

require

a

convicted

defendant

to

make

Laws 2001, c. 137, § 7, eff. April 30, 2001.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Sentencing and Punishment €=>2100.
Westlaw Key Number Search: 350Hk2100.
C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 1771 to 1786.
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Restitution,

In

general,

Probation, revocation for failure of indigent defendant to pay fine and
restitution, equal protection, see Bearden v. Georgia, U.S.Ga.1983, 103
S.Ct. 2064, 461 U.S. 660, 76 L.Ed.2d 221, on remand 167 Ga.App. 334, 308
S.E.2d 63.

Amount of

restitution,

Restitution
calculation,
losses
caused
by
offense
of
conviction,
unauthorized
use of credit card, see Hughey v. U.S., U.S.Tex.1990, 110 S.Ct. 1979, 495
U.S. 411, 109 L.Ed.2d 408, on remand 907 F.2d 39.

Restitution

as condition

of

probation,

Bankruptcy,
dischargeability
of
restitution
obligations
conditions
of probation, see Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport,
U.S.Pa.1990, 110 S.Ct. 2126, 495 U.S. 552, 109 L.Ed.2d 588.

imposed

as

Bankruptcy, restitution obligation discharge, condition of probation, see
Kelly v. Robinson, U.S.Conn.1986, 107 S.Ct. 353, 479 U.S. 36, 93 L.Ed.2d
216.
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Consideration of alternatives to incarceration before revocation, see Black
v. Romano, U.S.Mo.1985, 105 S.Ct. 2254, 471 U.S. 606, 85 L.Ed.2d 636, rehearing
denied 105 S.Ct. 3548, 473 U.S. 921, 87 L.Ed.2d 671.
Failure of indigent defendant to pay fine and restitution, equal protection,
see Bearden v. Georgia, U.S.Ga.1983, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 461 U.S. 660, 76
L.Ed.2d 221, on remand 167 Ga.App. 334, 308 S.E.2d 63.
Resentencing, drug possession, see U.S. v. Granderson, U.S.Ga.1994, 114
S.Ct. 1259, 511 U.S. 39, 127 L.Ed.2d 611.
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-301, UT ST § 77-38a-301
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C
West f s Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
*S Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos)
*il Part 3. Restitution Requirements
-f§ 77-38a-302. Restitution criteria
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court
shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in
this chapter, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make
restitution as part of a plea disposition. For purposes of restitution, a victim
has the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102 (14) and in determining whether
restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures as
provided in Subsections (2) through (5).
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and
court-ordered restitution.
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for
all losses caused by the defendant.
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having criminal
jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at
the time of sentencing or within one year after sentencing.
(c) Complete restitution and
provided in Subsection (5).

court-ordered

restitution

shall

be

determined

as

(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under
this part, the court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court
record.
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the
restitution, the court shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue.
(5) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing
court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense
that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal
activity, includes any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct
in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.
(b) In determining
the monetary
sum and
other
conditions
for
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including:

complete
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(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss
or destruction of property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and
devices relating to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care
and treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing recognized by the
law of the place of treatment;
(iii)
the
cost
rehabilitation;

of

necessary

physical

and

occupational

therapy

and

(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense
resulted in bodily injury to a victim;
(v) up to five days of the individual victim1 s determinable wages that are lost
due to theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were
owned by the victim and were essential to the victim's current employment at
the time of the offense; and
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted
in the death of a victim.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered
restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsections (5) (a)
and (b) and:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of
restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or
on other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution
and the method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances
inappropriate.

which

the

court

determines

may

make

restitution

(d) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (5) (d) (ii) , the court shall determine
complete
restitution
and
court-ordered
restitution,
and
shall
make
all
restitution orders at the time of sentencing if feasible, otherwise within one
year after sentencing.
(ii) Any pecuniary damages that have not been determined by the court within
one year after sentencing may be determined by the Board of Pardons and Parole.
(e) The Board of Pardons and Parole may, within one year after sentencing, refer
an order of judgment and commitment back to the court for determination of
restitution.
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 8, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 13, eff. May 6,
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2002; Laws 2002, c. 185, § 51, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 285, § 1, eff.
May 5, 2003; Laws 2005, c. 96, § 5, eff. May 2, 2005.
CROSS REFERENCES
Pardons and parole board, authority, see § 77-27-5.
Restitution, payment, see § 77-27-6.
Victims' bill of rights, see § 77-37-3.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Sentencing and Punishment €==>2133, 2148, 2150 to 2152, 2162, 2201.
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 350Hk2133; 350Hk2148; 350Hk2150 to

350Hk2152;

350Hk2162; 350Hk2201.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR Library
15 A.L.R.5th 391, Measure and Elements of Restitution to Which Victim is Entitled
Under State Criminal Statute.
NOTES OF DECISIONS
In general 1
Ability to pay 4
Acceptance of responsibility 8
Admissibility of evidence 21
Authority of court 5
Bankruptcy 23.5
Calculation of loss 6
Cause of loss 7
Court's jurisdiction to enforce restitution order 10
Criminal intent 9
Death of defendant 11
Discretion of court 12
Due process 2
Extradition costs 13
Hearing 20
Losses reimbursed by insurance 14
Mandamus 19
Pecuniary damage 15
Preservation of grounds for review 24
Remand 26
Reparations 16
Restitution order 23
Retrospective and ex post facto laws 3
Review 25
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C
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
*m Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos)
K
M Part 4. Restitution Judgments
-+§ 77-38a-401. Entry of judgment—Interest—Civil

actions—Lien

(1) Upon the court determining that a defendant owes restitution, the clerk of
the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as defined in Section
77-38a-302 on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of the order to the
parties.
(2) The order shall be considered a legal judgment, enforceable under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, the department may, on behalf of the
person in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(3) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of restitution and
the victim or department elects to pursue collection of the order by civil
process, the victim shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees.
(4) A judgment ordering restitution when recorded in a registry of judgments
docket shall have the same affect and is subject to the same rules as a judgment
in a civil action. Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of
sentencing, including prejudgment interest.
(5) The department shall make rules permitting the restitution payments to be
credited to principal first and the remainder of payments credited to interest in
accordance with Title 63, Chapter 4 6a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 9, eff. April 30, 2001.
CROSS REFERENCES

Crime Victims Reparations Act, reparations not to supplant restitution, see §
63-25a-403.
Restitution, reparations not to supplant restitution, see § 63-25a-403.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Interest €=>22(1) .
Sentencing and Punishment C^2212.
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 219k22(l); 350Hk2212.
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
K
S Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos)
K
& Part 4. Restitution Judgments
-•§ 77-38a-402. Nondischargeability in bankruptcy
Restitution imposed under this chapter and interest accruing in accordance with
Subsection 77-38a-401 (4) is considered a debt and may not be discharged in
bankruptcy.
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 10, eff. April 30, 2001.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Bankruptcy €=>3359.
Westlaw Key Number Search: 51k3359.
C.J.S. Bankruptcy § 333.
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-402, UT ST § 77-38a-402
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
K
d Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos)
K
\M Part 4. Restitution Judgments
-•§ 77-38a-403. Civil action by victim for damages
(1) Provisions in this part concerning restitution do not limit or impair the
right of a person injured by a defendant's criminal activities to sue and recover
damages from the defendant in a civil action. Evidence that the defendant has
paid or been ordered to pay restitution under this part may not be introduced in
any civil action arising out of the facts or events which were the basis for the
restitution. However, the court shall credit any restitution paid by the
defendant to a victim against any judgment in favor of the victim in the civil
action.
(2) If conviction in a criminal trial necessarily decides the issue of a
defendant's
liability
for
pecuniary
damages
of
a victim,
that
issue
is
conclusively determined as to the defendant if it is involved in a subsequent
civil action.
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 11, eff. April 30, 2001.
CROSS REFERENCES
Crime Victims Reparations Act, compensable losses and amounts, see § 63-25a-411

LIBRARY REFERENCES
Damages C=>63.
Judgment €=>559, 64 8.
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 115k63; 228k559; 228k648.
C.J.S. Damages §§ 169 to 171.
C.J.S. Judgments §§ 918, 920 to 929.
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-403, UT ST § 77-38a-403
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
K
d Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act
K
d Part 4. Restitution Judgments

(Refs & Annos)

-•§ 77-38a-404. Priority
(1) If restitution to more than one person, agency, or entity
time, the department shall establish the following priorities
as provided in Subsection (3):

is set at the same
of payment, except

(a) the crime victim;
(b) the Office of Crime Victim Reparations;
(c) any other government agency which has provided
a result of the offender's criminal conduct;
(d) the person, entity, or governmental
under Section 76-3-201.1 or 78-3a-118;

reimbursement

agency that has

(e) any insurance company which has provided
result of the offender's criminal conduct; and

reimbursement

(f) any county correctional facility to which the court
to pay restitution under Subsection 76-3-201(6).
(2) Restitution ordered
surcharges are paid.

under

Subsection

(1) (f)

offered

is

has

paid

to the victim

and paid

to

the

ordered

after

a

reward

victim

the

criminal

as

as

a

defendant

fines

and

(3)
If
the
offender
is
required
under
Section
53-10-404
to
reimburse
the
department
for
the
cost
of
obtaining
the
offender's
DNA
specimen,
this
reimbursement is the next priority after restitution to the crime victim under
Subsection (1)(a).
(4) All money
collected
for
department will be applied:

court-ordered

obligations

from

offenders

(a) first, to victim restitution, except the $30 per month required
collected by the department under Section 64-13-21, if applicable; and
(b) second,
if
Subsection (3).
Laws 2001, c.
1, 2002; Laws

applicable,

to

the

cost

of

obtaining

a

DNA

specimen

by

the

to

be

under

137, § 12, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 140, § 13, eff. July
2003, c. 278, § 3, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2003, c. 280, § 2, eff.
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C
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
K
M Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act
*i Part 5. Enforcement and Collection

(Refs & Annos)

-•§ 77-38a-501. Default and sanctions
(1) When a defendant defaults in the payment of a judgment for restitution or any
installment ordered, the court, on motion of the prosecutor, parole or probation
agent, victim, or on its own motion may impose sanctions against the defendant as
provided in Section 76-3-201.1.
(2)

The

court

may

not

impose

a

sanction

against

the

defendant

under

Subsection

(1) if:
(a) the defendant's sole default in the payment of a judgement for restitution is
the failure to pay restitution ordered under Subsection 76-3-201(6)
regarding
costs of incarceration in a county correctional facility; and
(b) the sanction would extend the defendant's term of probation or parole.
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 13, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws
2002; Laws 2003, c. 280, § 3, eff. May 5, 2003.

2002,

c.

35, § 14, eff. May

6,

LIBRARY REFERENCES
Sentencing and Punishment C=>2217.
Westlaw Key Number Search: 350Hk2217.
C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 1771 to 1786.
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-501, UT ST § 77-38a-501
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
*ii Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos)
*ii Part 5. Enforcement and Collection
-f§ 77-38a-502. Collection from inmate offenders
In addition to the remedies provided in Section 77-38a-501, the department upon
written request of the prosecutor, victim, or parole or probation agent, shall
collect restitution from offender funds held by the department as provided in
Section 64-13-23.
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 14, eff. April 30, 2001.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Convicts €^>7 (1) .
Westlaw Key Number Search: 98k7(1).
C.J.S. Convicts §§ 13 to 15.
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-502, UT ST § 77-38a-502
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
*H Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act
*& Part 6. Preservation of Assets

(Refs & Annos)

•+§ 77-38a-601. Preservation of assets
(1) At the time a criminal information, indictment charging a violation, or a
petition alleging delinquency is filed, or at any time during the prosecution of
the case, a prosecutor m a y petition the court to enter a restraining order or
injunction, require the execution of a satisfactory performance bond, or take any
other action to preserve the availability of property which m a y be necessary to
satisfy an anticipated restitution order if, in the prosecutor's best judgement,
there
is a
substantial
likelihood
that
a conviction
will
be obtained and
restitution will be ordered.
(a) Upon receiving a petition from a prosecutor under this Subsection (1), and
after notice
and
a hearing,
the
court may
enter
a restraining
order or
injunction, require the execution of a satisfactory performance bond, or take any
action necessary to preserve the availability of property which may be necessary
to satisfy an anticipated restitution order.
(b) An order entered under this Subsection (1) is effective
unless extended by the court for good cause shown.

for up to 90 days,

(2)
Prior
to the filing
of a
criminal
information,
indictment
charging
a
violation, or a petition alleging delinquency, a prosecutor m a y petition the court
to
enter
a
restraining
order
or
injunction,
require
the execution
of a
satisfactory
performance
bond,
or
take
any other
action
to preserve
the
availability
of property
which
m a y be necessary
to satisfy
an
anticipated
restitution order if, in the prosecutor's best judgement, there is a substantial
likelihood that a conviction will be obtained and restitution will be ordered.
(a) Upon receiving a request from a prosecutor under this Subsection (2), the
court m a y enter a restraining order or injunction, require the execution of a
satisfactory performance bond, or take any action necessary to preserve the
availability
of property
which m a y be necessary
to satisfy
an anticipated
restitution order after notice to persons appearing to have an interest in the
property and affording them an opportunity to be heard, if the court determines
that:
(i) there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that
the defendant committed it, and that failure to enter the order will result in
the property being sold, distributed, exhibited, destroyed, or removed from the
jurisdiction of the court, or otherwise be made unavailable for restitution; and
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(ii) the need to preserve the availability of the property or prevent its sale,
distribution, exhibition, destruction, or removal through the entry of the
requested order outweighs the hardship on any party against whom the order is
to be entered.
(b) An order entered under this
time given in the order.

Subsection

(2) is effective

for the period

of

(3) (a) Upon receiving a request
from a prosecutor under Subsection
(2) , and
notwithstanding Subsection
(2) (a) (i) , a court may enter a temporary
restraining
order
against
an owner with
respect
to specific property without
notice
or
opportunity for a hearing if:
(i) the prosecutor demonstrates that there is a substantial likelihood that the
property with respect to which the order is sought appears to be necessary to
satisfy an anticipated restitution order under this chapter; and
(ii) that provision of notice would jeopardize
to satisfy any restitution order or judgment.

the

availability

of the

property

(b) The temporary order in this Subsection (3) expires not more than ten days
after it is entered unless extended for good cause shown or the party against
whom it is entered consents to an extension.

(4) A hearing concerning an order entered under this section shall be held as soon
as possible, and prior to the expiration of the temporary order.
Laws 2004, c. 160, § 1, eff. May 3, 2004.
LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES
Recent developments in Utah law: I. Criminal law and procedure. The recent
legislative developments
section consists of brief expositions of
selected
statutes enacted by the 2004 Utah Legislature. 2005 Utah L. Rev. 341 (2005).
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-601, UT ST § 77-38a-601
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